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CALIFORNIA MECHANICS' LIEN LAW:
NEED FOR IMPROVEMENT
Gordon Hunt*
INTRODUCTION
The right to a mechanic's lien is found in Article XX of the
California Constitution,' which mandates the legislature to provide
for the "speedy and efficient enforcement" 2 of the right. The courts
of California have interpreted this mandate to mean that the legis-
lature is not vested with arbitrary power or discretion in enforcing
the constitutional right of lien.' The constitutional mandate requires
that the legislature establish a reasonably framed system for en-
forcing the right--not a system that is so cumbersome and ultra-
technical that it impairs the right or unduly hampers its exercise.
Despite the constitutional mandate to provide for the speedy
and efficient enforcement of the lien right and the admonition of
the courts not to create a burdensome and ultra-technical scheme,
the legislature has continually changed the law.4 The result is the
complex and confusing statutes which are in effect today.5
* B.A., 1956, University of California, Los Angeles; LL.B., 1959, University of
Southern California; Member of the California Bar.
1 CAL. CONST. art. XX, § 15 grants a lien to mechanics, materialmen, artisans,
and laborers of every class. CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 1181 (West 1955) has expanded the
right to contractors, subcontractors, architects, registered engineers, licensed land sur-
veyors, machinists, builders, teamsters and draymen, and all persons performing labor
upon or bestowing skill or other necessary services in a building, structure or other
work of improvement. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1184.1 (West Supp. 1967) also confers
a lien upon persons who perform the following services: demolish or remove improve-
ments, trees or other vegetation; drill test holes; grade; fill; install sewers; public
utilities; construct areas, vaults or cellars or rooms under sidewalks.
2 CAL. CONST. art. XX, § 15.
3 Hammond Lumber Co. v. Moore, 104 Cal. App. 528, 532, 286 P. 504, 505
(1930). Justice Henshaw, in his concurring opinion in the famous case of Roystone Co.
v. Darling, 171 Cal. 526, 544, 154 P. 15, 22-23 (1915), recognized that it is beyond the
power of the legislature to impair or destroy the lien right when he stated: "It would
seem when the constitution of this state declares, as it does, that 'mechanics, material-
men, artisans, and laborers of every class shall have a lien upon the property ...for
the value of such labor done and material furnished,' that it was wholly beyond the
power of the legislature to destroy or even to impair this lien."
4 The constantly changing law is a result of the sustained pressure on the legis-
lature by various competing interests within the construction industry, such as owners,
prime contractors, sub-contractors, material suppliers, laborers, bonding companies, title
companies, banks, and savings and loan associations.
5 The complexity of the mechanics' lien law has been recognized by courts and
commentators alike. As early as 1915, Justice Henshaw in Roystone Co. v. Darling, 171
Cal. 526, 546, 154 P. 15, 23 (1915), referred to the mechanics' lien law as " . . . this
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There is pending currently before the California Legislature a
bill to recodify the entire Mechanics' Lien Law." The proposed
recodification does not solve the existing problems because it merely
attempts to clarify the existing law by restating it in a more orderly
and logical sequence. It is hoped that the suggestions and com-
ments made in this article will ultimately result in more significant
substantive changes in the Mechanics' Lien Law.7
PRESENT PROBLEMS AND PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
Priority
The present law has several provisions that provide, in many
cases, for the speedy and efficient obliteration of lien rights. These
provisions are so cumbersome and ultra-technical that they impair
that right and unduly hamper its exercise. The section dealing
with priority' is the primary section destroying the right to a lien.
From the standpoint of the title companies and lending institutions,
priority must be maintained in order to insure proper financing of
construction projects. However, since the priority rule results in
the complete destruction of liens in many instances, alternatives
should be enacted by the legislature to grant priority to the lenders
and title companies, and, at the same time, protect the constitu-
tionally guaranteed right of lien.
The fundamental rule established by the priority section is
that if the work of improvement is commenced subsequent to the
recordation of the mortgage or deed of trust, then said mortgage
or deed of trust shall have priority over mechanics' liens.' The
exceptions to this fundamental rule of priority are:
(1) If the advances made by the lender are non-obliga-
tory and are not made to pay for the costs of the improve-
confused and confusing statute." Because the law has been amended at almost every
session of the legislature since then, the result is truly confusion compounded.
See also, Hopkins, Selected Mechanics' Lien Priority Problems, 16 HAST. L.J. 155
(1964): "The law of mechanics' liens is confusing. Even counsel for construction
lenders, builders, materialmen, title insurers, and others who are confronted daily with
problems in this area frequently battle the uncertainties and ambiguities in the law."
Accord, Comment, California Mechanics' Liens, 51 CALIF. L. REV. 331 (1963).
6 Senate Bill 805, introduced in 1968 and referred to committee for interim study.
It is anticipated that a revised version will be introduced in 1969.
7 One group which might help bring about some changes is the Citizens Advisory
Committee to the Joint judiciary Committees of the Assembly and Senate for the
Revision of the Mechanics' Lien Law.
8 The basic priority section is CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 1188.1 (West Supp. 1967);
sections 1188.2, 1189.1 and 1184.1 also deal with the questions of priority.
9 This is the basic meaning of CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 1188.1 (West Supp. 1967).
All liens relate back to the commencement of the work of improvement as a whole.
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ment, then said non-obligatory advances lose their priority
as to subsequently attaching mechanic's liens.' °
(2) If the work is of the type referred to in Code of Civil
Procedure section 1184.1 (often referred to in the indus-
try as "off site" improvements") and is done under a
separate contract with the owner, then commencement
of that work does not constitute commencement of the
structures. 2
(3) If the claimant does the type of work referred to
in Code of Civil Procedure section 1184.1 and even if this
type of work is done after the mortgage or deed of trust
has been recorded, the claimant will have priority over the
mortgage or deed of trust if the mortgage or deed of trust
was given for the sole or primary purpose of financing the
work of improvement. 13
10 See Fickling v. Jackman, 203 Cal. 657, 662, 265 P. 810, 812 (1928); Smith v.
Anglo-California Trust Co., 205 Cal. 496, 500-501, 271 P. 898, 900 (1928). See also
Yost-Linn Lumber Co. v. Williams, 121 Cal. App. 571, 9 P.2d 324 (1932); MARsH,CALiFoRNiA MECHANICS' L'EN LAW HANDBOOK 86 (1965). It has been stated indirectly
in appellate courts that advances made for non-construction purposes (i.e., land draw,
points, prepaid interest, etc.) are improper as against an equitable lien claimant.
Miller v. Mountain View Say. & Loan Ass'n, 238 Cal. App. 2d 644, 48 Cal. Rptr. 278(1965); Hunt, The Miller Case: Claimants' Delight, Lenders' Fright, 41 Los ANGELisBAR BULL. 262 (1966). They could be considered optional advances and therefore lose
their priority as against lien claimants and stop notice claimants. At least one trial
court has so held. Soule Steele Co. v. Brewer, Civil No. 126717 (San Bernadino Super.
Ct., 1967). It is submitted that by virtue of the building loan agreements in use today
in the construction industry, the lender retains such great control over the building
loan funds that any advance made by the lender could be considered an optional ad-
vance especially where the borrower had violated or breached one or more of the
clauses in the building loan agreement and the lender continued to advance funds,
thereby waiving the breach. See J. ACRET, CALIFORNIA CONSTRUCTION LAW MANUAL
207-08 (1967).
11 What is an "off site" improvement has been the subject of many problems
and much controversy in the construction industry. The primary example is where
the owner hires a grading contractor to cut, fill, grade and compact the land. In doing
this work the grading contractor not only works on the streets in the subdivision,
but also on the building pad sites. The street work is clearly "off site," but what about
the work done on the building pads? If that is done under a separate contract with
the owner, will the lien claimants be able to look to that work for priority purposes?
There is no satisfactory answer to the question. However, it seems that such work
should constitute commencement of the structures for priority purposes. For further
discussion of this "Off Site-On Site" problem see Hopkins, supra note 5 at 159, 160.
12 CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 1189.1 (a) (West Supp. 1967).
13 This result may be avoided if the loan proceeds are, in good faith, placed in
the control of the lender who has a binding agreement with the borrower to the effect
that such proceeds are to be applied to the payment of claims for labor and materials
used in the work of improvement and that no portion of the proceeds will be paid
to the borrower in the absence of satisfactory evidence that all claims for such labor
and materials have been paid or that the time for filing liens has expired and no such
liens have been filed. CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 1189.1(b) (3) (West Supp. 1967). The
language of this section has never been interpreted by the courts.
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The practical effect of this statute is that many mechanic's
liens are not worth the paper on which they are written. The prob-
lem is most prevalent in tract work, apartment buildings and other
speculative works of improvement. The usual problem is that the
borrower of the construction funds defaults and the lender fore-
closes its prior deed of trust. The mechanic's liens are thereby
wiped out. The net effect is that the constitutional right to a lien,
which the legislature has been commanded to speedily and effi-
ciently enforce, has been effectively destroyed by legislative en-
actment.14 Such a result certainly was not envisioned or contem-
plated by the framers of the constitution.
There are several approaches to the solution of the problems
involving priorities. First, the owner could be made personally
liable for any liens on his property, thereby shifting the risk of
loss to the very person who ultimately receives the benefit of the
claimant's labor or materials. 5 This would not be an unreasonable
burden since the owner could take the many steps available to him
to protect himself from liens.'6 A statute imposing personal liability
14 This result was the reason for the 1951 amendment to CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §
1190.1 (West Supp. 1967), giving claimants the right to file bonded stop notices. But
even that remedy has proven inadequate in many cases. When the job is in such con-
dition that stop notices are necessary, there are usually more stop notices than funds
available and the claimants usually end up with something far less than 100% of their
claim. The fact that so many liens were wiped out by foreclosure of prior deeds of
trust was also one of the underlying reasons for the equitable lien cases. Also see the
cases cited and discussed in Hunt, supra note 10, and the later cases of Doud Lumber
Co. v. Guarantee Say. & Loan Ass'n, 254 Cal. App. 2d 585, 60 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1967) ;
and McBain v. Santa Clara Say. & Loan Ass'n, 241 Cal. App. 2d 829, 51 Cal. Rptr. 78
(1966). See also Burden, Stop Notices and Equitable Liens: A Revolution in Private
Construction Work Remedies, 1 U.S.F. L. REV. 225 (1967). An attempt was made to
abolish the equitable lien by CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1190.1(n) (West Supp. 1967),
amending CAL. CODE CiV. PROC. § 1190.1 (West 1955).
15 See statute proposed infra. One writer has suggested that imposing personal
liability on the owner might be unconstitutional. Comment, The "Forgotten Man" of
Mechanics' Lien Laws-The Homeowner, 16 HAST. L.J. 198, 202 n.28 (1964). But see Id.
at 203 n.30.
16 He could require his prime contractor, or his segregated subcontractors if he
is an owner-builder, to furnish him with a labor and material bond under CAL. CODE
CIV. PROC. § 1185.1(c) (West Supp. 1967). See Burden, supra note 14 at 236-38, where
the author suggested other protective devices to be utilized by the owner (demand by
the owner for services of stop notice; false notice of claim invalid; tight building con-
trol system; and interpleader and declaratory relief).
The contrary argument here is that the owner is ignorant of CAL. CODE CIV. PaOC.
§ 1185.1 (West Supp. 1967). The problem of advising an owner of his rights under the
law was extensively reviewed in Bernard, Limitations of Owner's Liability for Me-
chanics' Liens, 16 HAST. L.J. 179 (1964). The article suggests that all construction
contracts be required to have a clause in them informing the owner that if a bond
is not obtained, the owner's liability is not limited to the contract price. This is an
excellent suggestion which could be accomplished by adding the following to CAL.
Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7018 (West Supp. 1967), dealing with the content of the notice:
You can limit your liability to your contract price with your contractor by
requiring him to furnish you with a bond that complies with California Code
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on the owner could be accomplished by an amendment to Code of
Civil Procedure section 1185.1 adding the following sentence to
subdivision (d):
If the owner fails to require the contractor to record the bond pro-
vided for herein, then the owner shall be personally liable for all
valid liens recorded pursuant to the provisions of Chapter II, Title
IV of Part 3 of this Code.
A variation on this theme would be to provide that the priority
afforded pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1188.1 would
be lost unless a labor and material bond were furnished. Thus, if
the construction lender, or any other holder of an encumbrance on
property being improved, wanted to retain the priority of his deed
of trust, he would require compliance with Code of Civil Procedure
section 1185.1. This could be accomplished by adding an addi-
tional paragraph to Code of Civil Procedure section 1188.1 as
follows:
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained herein, the liens
provided for in this chapter are preferred to any lien, mortgage, deed
of trust, or other encumbrance upon the premises and improvements
to which the liens provided for in this chapter attach unless compli-
ance is made with the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure sections
1185.1 (c) or 1188.2.
For those that feel that personal liability of the owner or loss
of priority upon failure to bond are remedies too drastic to solve
the problem presented (to-wit, loss of constitutionally guaranteed
lien rights by foreclosure of prior encumbrances), an alternative
compromise approach is suggested. This would be a two step ap-
of Civil Procedure section 1185.1, commonly known as a statutory labor and
material bond.
The courts have recognized that lenders can protect themselves in this fashion. See A-1
Door & Materials Co. v. Fresno Guar. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 61 Cal. 2d 728, 735, 394
P.2d 829, 834 (1964); McBain v. Santa Clara Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 241 Cal. App. 2d
829, 841-43, 51 Cal. Rptr. 78, 85-7 (1966) ; and Miller v. Mountain View Sav. & Loan
Ass'n, 238 Cal. App. 2d 644, 658-59, 48 Cal. Rptr. 278, 288 (1965).
The courts and the legislature have also noted that a prime contractor on public
work can protect himself if he will only take advantage of statutes enacted for his
benefit (as an owner can take advantage, on private works, of CAL. CODE Civ. PROC.§ 1185.1(c) (West Supp. 1967), which has been enacted for his benefit). See, California
Elec. Supply Co. v. United Pac. Life Ins. Co., 227 Cal. App. 2d 138, 148-50, 38 Cal.
Rptr. 479, 485-86 (1964).
An owner can also protect himself from liens by requiring releases from all sub-
contractors and suppliers before he pays his prime contractor or he can make pay-
ments by joint checks. The owner now enjoys the early twenty day notice under CA.
CODE CIV. PROC. § 1193 (West Supp. 1967), and is in a position to know who the
subcontractors and suppliers are on the job. Thus, he can require releases from, or
make joint checks payable to them. For an excellent discussion and analysis of the
joint check cases in California, see Moss, Joint Checks, Practices in the Construction
Industry, 43 J. ST. B. CALIF. 242 (1968).
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proach: first, to require bonding on all works of improvement ex-
ceeding $5,000.00 (thereby exempting small projects and the small
homeowner) and a concomitant increase in the bonding require-
ment under the Contractors' License Law, making it clear that un-
paid suppliers of labor and material are entitled to recover on said
bonds.'7 This would be accomplished by amending Code of Civil
Procedure sections 1185.1(d) or 1188.1 and Business and Profes-
sions Code section 7071.9.
Code of Civil Procedure section 1185.1(d) would be amended
by adding an additional sentence reading as follows:
If the total cost of any work of improvement exceeds the sum of five
thousand dollars ($5,000.00) and the owner fails to require the con-
tractor to record the bond provided for herein, then the owner shall
be personally liable for all valid liens recorded pursuant to the provi-
sions of Chapter II, Title IV of Part 3 of this Code.
In the alternative, Code of Civil Procedure section 1188.1
could be amended by adding the following paragraph:
Where the total cost of the work of improvement exceeds five thou-
sand dollars ($5,000.00) then notwithstanding anything to the con-
trary contained herein, the liens provided for in this chapter are pre-
ferred to any lien, mortgage, deed of trust, or other encumbrance upon
the premises and improvements to which the liens provided for in this
chapter attach unless compliance is made with the provisions of Code
of Civil Procedure sections 1185.1 (c) or 1188.2.
Along with the Code of Civil Procedure section 1188.1, Busi-
ness and Professions Code section 7071.9 would be amended to
read:
Except as provided in section 7071.5, the board shall require, on or
after , as a condition precedent to the issuance, reinstate-
ment, reactivation, or reissuance of a license, and on or after
, as a condition precedent to the renewal of a license,
17 It appears that CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7071.9 (West 1964) as it presently
exists is for the benefit of unpaid suppliers of labor and material. The statute states
that the bond or cash deposit is for the benefit of ". . .(a) any person damaged as a
result of a violation of this chapter by the licensee. . . ... Certainly, if the legislature
wanted to limit this bond to be for the benefit of owners only, they would not have
used the language "any person." Consequently, if an unpaid subcontractor or material
supplier of a licensed contractor could show that the licensee violated the Business
and Professions Code, resulting in loss to the subcontractor or supplier, the subcon-
tractor or supplier should be allowed to recover on the bond. Some examples would be
abandonment of the job resulting in nonpayment (CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7107
(West 1964)), a diversion or misapplication of funds or property (Id. § 7108), avoid-
ing debts by bankruptcy, assignment for benefit of creditors, etc. (Id. § 7113.5), wilful
or fraudulent act injuring the claimant (Id. § 7116), and wilful failure to pay money
when due (Id. § 7123). See Comment, The "Forgotten Man" of Mechanics' Lien
Laws-The Homeowner, 16 HAsT. L.J. 198, 203 n.34 (1964).
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that the applicant file or have on file with the Registrar a bond issued
by an admitted surety in the sum of five thousand dollars ($5,000.00)
in favor of the State of California, or in lieu thereof, that such appli-
cant post with the Registrar a cash deposit in the sum of five thousand
dollars ($5,000.00). Such bond or cash deposit required by this section
shall be for the benefit of (a) any person damaged as a result of a
violation of this chapter by the licensee, (b) any person who, after
entering into a construction contract with the licensee, is damaged by
the failure of the licensee to perform the contract, (c) any person fur-
nishing labor or materials used in the direct performance of a con-
struction contract, and (d) any laborer, contractor, subcontractor or
material supplier who the applicant fails to pay for labor and/or
material furnished on any work of improvement.
The foregoing proposals are variations on the main theme of
mandatory bonding on private works of improvement. Presently,
public works projects, both federal and state, must be bonded.I"
Under the federal statute the labor and material bond must be fur-
nished on all contracts over $2,000.0011 and under the state statute
the labor and material bond must be furnished on all contracts over
$2,500.00.20
Mandatory bonding on private works is not a new concept
and has been suggested many times. 21 The major arguments against
mandatory bonding are:
1. It might be unconstitutional. 22
2. It would unduly increase the costs of construction to
the owner because the contractor would pass the cost
of the premium on the bond to the owner.
18 40 U.S.C. §§ 270a-270e (commonly known as the Miller Act) and CAL. Gov'T.
CODE §§ 4200-4210 (West 1966) (commonly known as the California Public Works
Bond Act and often referred to as the "Little Miller Act"). See California Elec. Supply
Co. v. United Pac. Life Ins. Co., 227 Cal. App. 2d 138, 144, 38 Cal. Rptr. 479, 482
(1964).
'9 40 U.S.C. § 270a(a).
20 CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 4200 (West 1966).
21 See generally Comment, The "Forgotten Man" of Mechanics' Lien Laws-
The Homeowner, supra note 15, and Comment, California Mechanics' Liens, 51 CALIF.
L. REv. 331-38 (1963). The authors of these law review articles refer favorably to the
bonding plan often suggested by my late law partner, Mr. Glen Behymer, to-wit,
mandatory bonding and/or withholding of 25% of the contract price until the lien
period expired. See also Comment, Mehanics' Liens and Surety Bonds in the Build-
ing Trades, 68 YALE L.J. 138 (1958).
22 See Gibbs v. Tally, 133 Cal. 373, 65 P. 970 (1901), in which the California
Supreme Court held that a statute making the owner personally liable for liens if he
failed to obtain a bond in the amount of 25% of the contract price is unconstitutional
because it made the owner liable for a debt he did not owe and therefore violated the
constitutional guarantees of the right of acquiring, possessing and protecting property.
Impairment or deprivation of the right to contract is also given as a constitutional
argument against mandatory bonding.
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3. Too many contractors in the construction industry
could not obtain bonds, thereby forcing them out of
business. In the alternative, said contractors would
reach their bonding capacity so quickly that it would
seriously affect their ability to expand and take in
additional work.
4. It would prevent young men without substantial assets
from entering the contracting field.
5. The resultant drop in the number of bondable con-
tractors would result in an overall reduction in pri-
vate construction thereby creating further economic
problems for the already troubled construction indus-
try in California.
6. The present law containing the optional bond for the
owner under Code of Civil Procedure section 1185.1
and the right of lien and stop notice afford sufficient
protection for lien claimants and owners alike.
The arguments favoring mandatory bonding are as follows:
1. It would not be unconstitutional.23
2. Mandatory bonding on public works has not pre-
vented the public agencies from finding contractors
ready, willing and able to do the work and obtain the
necessary bonds.
3. Unbondable contractors would be unable to do busi-
ness, thereby stabilizing the industry by eliminating
marginal elements.24
4. It would compel the sureties to change their attitudes
and standards in order to enable more contractors to
obtain bonds.25
5. Coupled with mandatory bonding would be further
amendments to Code of Civil Procedure section 1193
23 See Roystone Co. v. Darling, 171 Cal. 526, 154 P. 15 (1915), wherein the present
CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1185.1 (West Supp. 1967), was held constitutional. Since there
is no increased liability of the owner over that contracted for, the mandatory bonding
concept does not impair the right to contract. Cf. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Nelson
Mfg. Co., 291 U.S. 352 (1934).
24 During the building slump of the past two years, most of the contractors who
would not be bondable have dropped out of the industry by reason of bankruptcy or
lack of adequate capital.
25 Since the sureties' risks would be increased, they would have to take a more
active part and interest in the business manner of their bonded contractors.
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adding the bonding company as a further recipient of
the twenty day notice and the naming of the bonding
company and its address in the notice of improve-
ment which is posted and recorded.26
6. The cost of mandatory bonding, when compared with
the high cost of lien and stop notice litigation, would
not be an unreasonable increased burden on the
owner.
27
7. Most importantly, mandatory bonding would com-
pletely protect the homeowner and would insure that
those persons who have been given the constitutional
rights of lien would, indeed, be provided by the legis-
lature with a "speedy and efficient" enforcement of that
right as decreed by the constitution.
It is true that the risk of loss would be shifted to the prime
contractor or owner-builder and their surety, but they are usually
the parties most able to afford that risk. Also, since they hold the
purse strings, they are the parties in the best position to see to it
that losses do not occur. Finally, because they are at the source of
the construction funds and are given notice of potential claimants,
they can direct the flow of the funds to insure that the claimants
are paid.
Upon consideration of the problems and alternative solutions,
it seems that mandatory bonding is truly the appropriate legisla-
tive answer to the problems of the Mechanics' Lien Law. Manda-
tory bonding could be accomplished by amending Code of Civil
Procedure section 1185.1(c) as follows:
Where the cost of a work of improvement to the owner exceeds the
sum of $2,500.0028 then the owner shall, prior to the commencement
of said work of improvement, obtain and record in the office of the
county recorder where the real property is located, a bond written by
a corporate surety licensed to write surety bonds in the State of Cal-
ifornia, in an amount equal to 100% of the contract price or the esti-
mated cost of construction. Said bond shall be conditioned for the
payment in full of the claims of all persons performing labor upon
or furnishing materials to be used in, or furnishing appliances, teams,
26 This would give the bonding companies notice of potential claimants so that
they could take steps, if they deemed said steps necessary, to see to it that their prin-
cipal on the bond paid the claimants. See p. 112 infra.
27 It actually would be a great deal less expensive to an owner than the possible
loss of his property through foreclosure or having to pay twice for the construction
work. Mandatory bonding would eliminate the double payment problem for the owner.
28 This figure ties in with CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 4200 (West 1966). This will exempt
small jobs where the bond would be a nuisance and the losses small.
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or power contributing to, such work, in addition to any conditions for
the performance of the contract. Said bond shall be made by its terms
to inure to the benefit of any and all persons who perform labor upon
or furnish materials to be used in or furnish appliances, teams, or power
contributing to, the work described in said contract as to give such
persons a direct right of action to recover upon said bond in any suit
brought to foreclose the liens provided for in this chapter or in a
separate suit brought on said bond.
It shall be mandatory for the owner to obtain and record the bond as
herein provided. If said bond is so obtained and recorded, then the
recovery in any action to foreclose a lien provided for in this chapter
shall be limited to an aggregate amount equal to the amount to be due
from the owner to the contractor. Judgment shall be rendered against
the contractor or owner-builder and his sureties on said bond for any
deficiency or difference that may remain between said amount so
found to be due to the contractor and the whole amount found to be
due to claimants for such labor or materials or both.
If the owner should fail to obtain and record such a bond, then the
liens provided for in this chapter shall be prior to any lien, mortgage,
deed of trust, or other encumbrance upon the real property upon which
the work of improvement is being erected. However, said owner may,
at any time before completion of the work of improvement, obtain
and record the aforesaid bond which, when so obtained and recorded,
will constitute compliance with this section.
If, at any time during construction, the contract price or estimated
cost of construction shall exceed the original contract price or esti-
mated cost of construction by more than 10%, then an additional bond
in a penal sum equal to said increase shall be obtained and recorded
by the owner.
Code of Civil Procedure section 1185.1(d) should also be
amended as follows:
It shall not be competent for the owner and contractor, or either of
them, by any term of their contract, or otherwise, to waive the re-
quirement of subdivision (c) of this section. In the event that a
licensed contractor enters into any contract with an owner or owner-
builder and the bond provided for in subsection (c) hereof is not
obtained, then said contractor's license shall be forthwith revoked
by the State Contractors' License Board without possibility of rein-
statement.
There can be no question that mandatory bonding would solve
most of the problems of the construction industry today. Perhaps
the above statutes, if enacted, could go further and provide that
whenever a statutory labor and material bond is obtained there
shall be no right of lien or stop notice. This would relieve the
owner and title companies of having their property tied up with
mechanics' liens29 and would relieve the lenders of the problems
29 This would certainly be in keeping with the statement of the supreme court
[Vol. 9
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of stop notices. Certainly, claimants would prefer a cause of action
against a licensed surety to a questionable lien or stop notice.
Notice
The next major area where the legislature has created an ultra-
technical and burdensome scheme for the enforcement of the lien
right is the notice requirement under Code of Civil Procedure sec-
tion 1193, recently amended .3 The new notice provisions require
that for a claimant to preserve his lien and stop notice rights, he
must give a written notice to the owner, the original contractor and
the construction lender within 20 days after he first furnishes labor
or material to the job site, unless he is a laborer for wages or a
"contractor" as that term is used in subdivision (b) of Code of
Civil Procedure section 1193.31 Thus, all potential claimants, ex-
cept those excluded by the statute, must, as soon as they receive
a contract, purchase order or other order for a job, ascertain the
name and address of three parties.
The financial burden created by this new notice requirement
has in some cases adversely affected the construction industry. This
new notice provision has made it extremely difficult for potential
lien and stop notice claimants to comply with the new law. In
many cases it is almost impossible for a potential claimant to get
the necessary information to comply with the new notice provisions
or the information obtained is incorrect. 2 This new section has not
yet been interpreted by the courts, but, because of the problems
of compliance, the courts should give it a liberal construction.
in Borchers Bros. v. Buckeye Incubator Co., 59 Cal. 2d 234, 239, 379 P.2d 1, 3 (1963):
"From the point of view of lien claimants, the words 'speedy and efficient' must ob-
viously be interpreted to mean that the Legislature should arrange for them to receive
their money as soon as possible after supplying the labor or materials.
On the other hand, the property owner also has an interest which must be pro-
tected. From his standpoint, the words 'speedy and efficient' should be interpreted
to mean that his title should be cleared as soon as possible, so that it will have some
marketability."
80 The amendment was effective November 8, 1967.
31 The word "contractor" as used in subdivision (b) of CAL. CODE Civ. PROC. §
1193 (West Supp. 1967), means the traditional definition of prime contractor, that is,
a person contracting with the owner to erect the entire work of improvement as a
whole. A "contractor" (usually operating as a subcontractor dealing with a prime con-
tractor) dealing directly with an owner-builder, where there is no true prime contrac-
tor, must give the notice to the construction lender only. That is the reason for
subdivision (b) which, at first blush, appears to conflict with subdivision (a).
32 It should be noted that in addition to the necessity of obtaining the name and
address of the reputed owner, contractor and lender, the claimant must also ascertain
the information necessary to comply with subdivision (c) of CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. §
1193 (West Supp. 1967). One organization in Los Angeles, the Building Materials
Dealers' Credit Association, attempts to compile the names and addresses of the owner,
lender and prime contractor on all jobs and will make this information available to
any person in the industry free of charge.
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Many attorneys find the new notice section confusing and have
difficulty advising their clients. Thus, the problem is even further
compounded when a lather, plasterer, painter or other tradesman
attempts to comply with this new and burdensome notice require-
ment. If a lawyer, trained to read, interpret and understand the
law, has difficulty with the law, certainly we cannot expect a lay-
man to do better and we cannot truthfully say that the legisla-
tion is not burdensome or ultra-technical. It was not intended that
the lien claimant should have to consult legal counsel to enable
him to comply with a law supposedly enacted for his benefit, espe-
cially when the claimant must give the notice early in the job. On
the other hand, there are many potential claimants who hail the
new notice provision as an effective new provision in the lien law.
They find that with notices going to owners, contractors and lend-
ers there is less chance of diversion of funds. However, these
claimants are usually large organizations that are better able
financially to hire the personnel and expend the funds necessary
to allow them to comply effectively with the new law.
The notice statute was a compromise bill that was agreed
upon by the construction industry as a whole, although not en-
thusiastically in many quarters. Since many people in the industry
feel that it is working to the advantage of the overall industry,
no attempt should be made to change the basic principle behind
the statute (i.e., early notice) but merely to improve upon it. This
could be accomplished by a requirement that the owner, contractor,
construction lender, title company, surety on any labor and mate-
rial bond or any person causing a work of improvement to be
constructed, be required to post and record a notice of improvement
which would contain the name and address of the owner, contractor,
and construction lender, the street address and legal description
of the job site, and the name and address of any bonding company
who had furnished a labor and material bond to the job. Such a
requirement would not be a difficult burden for the owner, con-
tractor, lender or title company because they are the persons who
are possessed of said information and it is to their own interest
and benefit that the information furnished to potential lien and
stop notice claimants is correct. In this way they will get the pre-
liminary notices and be able to take steps to see to it that said
potential lien claimants are paid and thereby avoid liens and stop
notices on the job. The burden is no greater than that required
in connection with the posting and recording of a notice of non-
responsibility."
33 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1183.1 (a) & (b) (West 1955).
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The aforesaid changes in the notice requirement could be
accomplished by adding subdivision (e) to Code of Civil Procedure
section 1193 as follows:
(e) Prior to the commencement of the work of improvement the
owner, or any other person causing a work of improvement to be con-
structed, or the contractor, or the construction lender, or the title
company, or the surety on any labor and material bond, shall cause to
be posted on the real property in some conspicuous place and recorded
in the office of the county recorder of the county where the property is
located, on every work of improvement, a notice of improvement.
Said notice of improvement shall contain (1) the name and address
of the owner or any other person causing the work of improvement
to be erected,34 (2) the name and address of the contractor or con-
tractors on the job,35 (3) the name and address of the construction
lender, if any, (4) the street address and legal description of the job
site, and (5) the name and address of the surety and type of bond
furnished by any surety on the job.
If such a notice of improvement is not so posted and recorded, then
compliance with the provisions of sections (a) and (b) shall not be
necessary.36 If such a notice of improvement is so posted and re-
corded then, in addition to the methods of service provided for in
subdivision (c) hereof, the notices required under subdivisions (a) and
(b) hereof may then be sent to the owner, contractor and lender at
the name and address set forth in the notice of improvement and the
claimant shall also send the notice to the surety named in said notice
of improvement.
A further alternative would be to change the last sentence of
the above suggested amendment to read as follows:
If such a notice of improvement is so posted and recorded, then the
notices required under subdivisions (a) and (b) hereof must be sent
to the owner, contractor, lender and surety at the addresses shown in
said notice of improvement in order to be valid.
This would provide a source, to-wit, the job site and the county
recorder's office, where potential claimants could look for the in-
formation required by the preliminary notice provisions of the code.
It also would insure that the parties who are interested in receiving
34 This takes into account the situation where the work is being done by some-
body other than the owner, such as the lessee.
35 This is to cover the situation where there is no true prime contractor and
the owner-builder is contracting directly with the segregated subcontractors (i.e.,
where an owner-builder contracts directly with the electrician, plumber, painter,
framer, cement finisher, roofer, etc.).
36 This sentence would have the effect of eliminating the twenty day notice. This
would be the means of compelling compliance with the statute; that is, if the owner,
contractor, lender, title company or surety wanted early notice, they would have to
post and record the notice of improvement. For those who feel this is too drastic, an
alternative is suggested in the article.
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such notices actually receive them and thereby accomplish the basic
purpose of the statute.
Practical Legal Problems
1. Bringing Suit
The priority problem goes to the very heart of the mechanic's
lien right and is a problem of the claimant and attorney alike. The
notice problem is primarily one of compliance which the claimant
himself faces. There are other problems that confront lawyers prac-
ticing in the area of mechanic's liens. One of the most perplexing of
these problems is the question of when suit must be brought on a
stop notice. The section governing this is Code of Civil Procedure
section 1197.1. The basic rule is that suit cannot be brought prior
to the expiration of the period of time within which the lien claims
can be filed and no later than 90 days thereafter.
The problems that result from the basic rule are many. The
major problem is ascertaining the lien period when the notice of
completion or notice of cessation of labor has not been recorded. It
is almost impossible to ascertain when a job was completed until you
indulge in discovery. Calculating the time element becomes even
more difficult when there is a cessation of labor, i.e., 60 days cessa-
tion, thus a 90 day lien period and then the 90 days for filing suit on
the stop notice commences. Sometimes there may even be a cessation
of labor which the materialmen are unable to ascertain.
The practical problem for an attorney is that normally he will
be filing suit on both a lien and a stop notice. Normally the time to
file suit on the lien"7 will expire before the commencement of the
period to file suit on the stop notice. Thus, the attorney is forced
to file two separate lawsuits; one on the mechanic's lien and a
second on the stop notice. This is, of course, a waste of time and
money. 8 The better practice is to file on both and then ask the
lender to waive the defense of prematurity. 9
37 Ninety days from recordation of the lien. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1198.1
(West Supp. 1967).
38 The double suit problem has been recognized by other writers. See Burden,
supra note 14 at 231, 232. One writer has termed it a "trap for the unwary." See Ilyin,
Stop Notice!I-Construction Loan Officer's Nightmare, 16 HAST. L.J. 187, 190 (1964).
39 The defense is waived if not raised by demurrer or plea in abatement. See
Miller v. Mountain View Say. & Loan Ass'n, 238 Cal. App. 2d 644, 654, 48 Cal. Rptr.
278, 285-86 (1965). It therefore could expressly be waived. This results in no prejudice
to the lender, for once the stop notice suits are served on the lender, or once the ninety
days following the expiration of the lien period has run and the lender has received no
further notices under CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1197.1(b) (West Supp. 1967), he can
have the cases consolidated under CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1197.1(c) or (d) (West
Supp. 1967). (The only risk that the lender runs is that posed by Sunlight Elec.
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The next problem presented by Code of Civil Procedure section
1197.1 is the exception contained therein which states that if the
claim of the stop notice claimant arose out of a work of improvement
subject to acceptance by a city, county or other local governmental
agency, the suit on the stop notice shall be brought not less than 90
and no more than 180 days after the last delivery of materials or
performance of work. The problems here are even more complex.
The first question presented concerns the types of jobs to which
the exception is applicable. Most construction jobs are subject
to some kind of acceptance by a city, county or other local
governmental agency. It seems that this exception should be ap-
plicable only to those cases where some affirmative act is taken by
a governmental authority whereby it formally accepts a job.
The next question arises where the delivery of material or
labor ceases, more than 180 days pass and then the local city, county
or other governmental agency formally accepts the job. Can the
claimant rely on this later acceptance? It would seem that he could.40
Finally, does the language "after the last delivery of materials
or performance of work" mean the last delivery of materials or per-
formance of work by the claimant or the job as a whole? Cessation
of work on the job as a whole would be the better rule. The amend-
ment appears to have been enacted to overcome the effect of the de-
cision of Southwest Paving Co. v. Stone Hill,4 where the court held
that the lien period stayed open until the public body accepted the
work of improvement.
All the above problems could be solved by amending section
1197.1 to read:
Actions to enforce the payment of any claim, notice of which may be
given pursuant to Article 2, shall be commenced against the owner,
the State or any public board, commission, or officer thereof, any
political subdivision of the state or disbursing officer thereof whose
duty it is to make payments under provisions of such contracts and
any of the parties described in subdivision (h) of section 1190.1 within
90 days after the service of said claims upon said party or parties,
but shall not be brought to trial prior to the expiration of 90 days
Supply Co. v. McKee, 226 Cal. App. 2d 47, 37 Cal. Rptr. 782 (1964)). Most lenders
will try to interplead the construction loan funds and attempt to get out of the case
with their attorney fees and court costs. This is improper, and trial courts have ruled
differently where the issue has been raised. See Hunt, supra note 10 at 295 n.33, for
the trial court decisions bearing on this problem.
40 It is submitted that this is analogous to the estoppel theory raised in Doherty
v. Carruthers, 171 Cal. App. 2d 214, 340 P.2d 58 (1959), and the claimant has a
right to rely on the action of the local governmental agency. This analysis also seems
to fall within subdivision (e) of CAL. CODE Cxv. PRoC. § 1193.1 (West Supp. 1967),
which is the basic section governing the time to file liens and stop notices.
41 206 Cal. App. 2d 548, 24 Cal. Rptr. 48 (1962).
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after the expiration of the period within which claims of lien must be
filed for record as prescribed by section 1193.1 of this Code.
The purpose of the existing statute is to hold off suits against
the public body or the lender until the lien period has run. This
amendment will conform Code of Civil Procedure section 1197.1 (a)
to 1198.1 (a) and thereby allow the claimant's attorney to sue on the
lien and stop notice in one suit, thus eliminating the expense to
all parties of multiplicity of actions. At the same time the amend-
ment will hold off trial until 90 days after the lien period had ex-
pired, thereby allowing the owner and the construction lender to
consolidate under Code of Civil Procedure sections 1197.1(c) and
(d) and 1199.1.
2. Delay in Court
Another problem for claimant's attorneys is the two year dis-
cretionary dismissal provision of Code of Civil Procedure section
1198.1(a). In large metropolitan areas it is very difficult to get to
trial in two years. The California Supreme Court, in Borchers Bros.
v. Buckeye Incubator Co.,42 has stated that the constitutional man-
date for the "speedy and efficient" enforcement of liens means that
the legislature should arrange for lien claimants to receive their
money as soon as possible after supplying their labor or materials,
and that the owner's title should be cleared as soon as possible.
Certainly an amendment to the law creating a priority for trial pur-
poses similar to that provided in other portions of the law43 would be
consistent with the constitutional provision and the suggestion of the
supreme court in the Borchers Bros. case.44
The problem of getting to trial within two years can be al-
leviated by an amendment to Code of Civil Procedure section
1198.1(a) which would delete the last sentence and replace it with
the following:
Actions brought under the provisions of Chapter II of Title IV of
Part 3 of this Code shall be set for trial at the earliest possible date
42 59 Cal. 2d 234, 239, 379 P.2d 1, 3 (1963).
43 For example: CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. § 1291.2 (West Supp. 1967) (arbitration);
Id. § 1179(a) (unlawful detainer and forcible entry and retainer); Id. § 660 (mo-
tion for new trial) ; Id. § 527 (hearing on preliminary injunction).
44 The problem of getting to trial is compounded by the fact that all parties
who have any interest in the real property must be joined as parties defendant or the
judgment will not be binding upon them. See Packard Bell Elec. Corp. v. Theseus,
Inc., 244 Cal. App. 2d 355, 53 Cal. Rptr. 300 (1966). It is often difficult, if not im-
possible, to get a lot book report, preliminary title report or mechanic's lien fore-
closure guarantee from the title companies when your client's lien is on a large tract
of homes, shopping center or other large parcel of property with overlapping encum-
brances and multiple recorded leases. Even if one could get such information from the
title companies, the cost is prohibitive in a municipal court matter.
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and shall take precedence of all other cases, except other matters of
the same character and matters to which special procedure may be
given by law.
This would certainly provide for the "speedy and efficient" en-
forcement of liens. It would also allow lien claimants to receive their
money as soon as possible after supplying labor or material and at
the same time would clear the title of the owner so that it will have
some marketability.
3. Proving Use of Materials
A final problem is that of proving use of materials in the job.
The burden is not difficult for a contractor who has himself installed
the materials. The problem is difficult for a materialman whose cus-
tomer (normally the subcontractor) has become insolvent and has
disappeared. The materialman then finds it difficult, if not impos-
sible, to find witnesses who actually saw the material being installed
in the job.
Trial judges hold lien claimants to varying degrees of proof.45
Some hold the claimant to a strict burden of proof. Some will draw
the inference that all the material was used in the job if you can
prove that most of it was actually used. Some judges, in the absence
of any evidence that material was taken from the job or diverted
from one job to another, will draw the inference that the material
was used in the job if the claimant can produce sufficient evidence
tracing the material from the claimant's business to the job site.
The latter is the better rule. In the normal course of human events
and as a practical fact of the construction industry, once materials
get to the job site they are installed and therefore, the inference to
be logically drawn from the proved fact of delivery to the job site
is incorporation into the job. Other states have solved this problem
by enacting as a rebuttable presumption that which is logically in-
ferred when evidence of delivery to the job site has been proved.46
45 Of necessity, this is the author's personal reflection based on his practice in the
area of construction law.
46 It should be noted, in passing, that delivery to the job site by the claimant in
the first instance is not the law and never has been the law. Many attorneys labor
under the misapprehension that unless a materialman can prove that he delivered
the material directly to the job site, he is not entitled to a lien. All that the claimant
need show is that his materials were furnished for use in the job and in fact used
in the job. As a practical matter, there are many industries where the material is
delivered first to the premises of the subcontractor and then taken, as needed, during
the progress of the job. As long as the lien claimant can trace his materials, he is en-
titled to a lien. See R. HOFFMAN & G. HUNT, Procedural Requirements for Liens and
Stop Notices on Private Works of Improvement, MECHANIC's LIEN LAW AND CALFOR-
NIA AND FEDERAL PUBLIC WORs LAW 27, 28 (1967). Another writer states:
Many contractors have the idea that a material supplier, in order to be en-
titled to mechanic's lien rights, must have delivered his materials to the jobsite.
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The State of California should adopt a similar statute by adding
subdivision (e) to Code Civil Procedure section 1182, which would
read:
For the purposes of this chapter, upon the trial of any action to en-
force any claim pursuant to this chapter, proof of the delivery of
materials to the site improvement or proof of the delivery of mate-
rials other than to the site improvement but upon the written state-
ment by any agent of the owner, as defined in subdivision (c) of this
section, shall create a rebuttable presumption that such materials
were incorporated into the work of improvement.
CONCLUSION
The foregoing analysis points up some of the major problems
in the Mechanics' Lien Law. The statutory changes suggested herein
will alleviate these problems and go a long way toward truly provid-
ing for the payment and the "speedy and efficient enforcement" of
the claims of those who have supplied labor and material to a con-
struction project, thereby enhancing its value and the security of the
lender thereon.
... [Ilt is clear that this is not true.
The fact of delivery to the jobsite is a factor which helps to prove two
things: 1) That the supplier intended the materials to go into the job; and
2) That they actually went into the job. But so long as those two elements
are present, the materialman is entitled to a mechanic's lien whether or not he
delivered the materials to the jobsite. J. AcRET, CALIFORIA CONSTRUCION
LAW MANUAL 181 (1967).
See Theisen v. County of Los Angeles, 54 Cal. 2d 170, 352 P.2d 529 (1960).
